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ABSTRACT 
The Austrian Act on Corporate Criminal Liability (VbVG) entered force on 1 January 
2006 and has now been in effect fourteen years. The following article will evaluate the 
VbVG’s frequency of application in practice and critically examine the dominance of pro-
cedural termination (rather than prosecution) at the discretion of the district attorney’s 
office.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
By introducing the Austrian Act on Corporate Criminal Liability (VbVG)1, which was 
preceded by a prolonged discussion process2, the Austrian legislature embarked on new 
territory in criminal law. Departing from the principle that only natural persons can be 
prosecuted (“societas delinquere non potest”), the VbVG regulates the conditions under 
which entities can be held responsible for criminal acts committed within their respective 
organizational domains. 
 
The VbVG aims to prevent corporate crime. Accordingly, aspects of prevention play a 
crucial role in the Austrian manifestation of corporate criminal liability.3 Entities are ex-
pected to take active measures to prevent criminal conduct by their employees and those 
responsible for their executive bodies.4 The strong nature of the concept of prevention 
should guarantee protection for victims, make economic life more fair, and strengthen 
Austria as a place to do business.  
 
By now, any objections raised against the VbVG from the standpoint of constitutional 
law have been dispelled by the Austrian Constitutional Court (VfGH).5 The VfGH be-
lieves it is permissible to hold an entity responsible for a natural person's unlawful and 
culpable conduct if they are connected with that entity. Furthermore, the VfGH expressly 
states that the principle of culpability applies only to natural persons in individual crimi-
nal law, but not to entities. 
 
What follows is a brief overview of the VbVG’s provisions under criminal law, after which 
the article will focus on the VbVG’s frequency of application while especially considering 








1  BGBl I 151/2005 as ammended by BGBl I 26/2016. 
2  For historical development of the statute see: FRITZ ZEDER, VBVG 30 et seq. (2006). 
3  Marianne Hilf & Fritz Zeder, in: Wiener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 18 VbVG marginal no. 1 (Frank 
Höpfel & Eckart Ratz, 2nd ed., 2010); Marianne Hilf, Verfolgungsermessen und Diversion im Verbandsstraf-
verfahren, in: Strafprozessrecht im Wandel: Festschrift für Roland Miklau zum 65. Geburtstag 192 (Reinhard 
Moos et al eds., 2006); Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfah-
rungen, ANWALTSBLATT 415, 417 (2013). 
4  ErläutRV 994 BlgNR 22. GP 34. 
5  VfGH 2.12.2016, G 497/2015, G 679/2015. 
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II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE VbVG 
 
A. Conditions for Corporate Liability 
 
For the purposes of § 1 VbVG, “entities” (and therefore those on whom penalties are im-
posed) means legal entities governed by private or public law, registered partnerships, and 
European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIGs). Essential criteria for responsibility are 
that the criminal act be committed by a natural person allocable to the entity (decision 
maker or employee under § 2 VbVG) either (1) to benefit the entity or (2) in breach of one 
or more of the entity's obligations (§ 3 VbVG). Criminal acts committed by a decision 
maker may be directly allocated to the entity, but criminal acts committed by an employee 
may be allocated to the entity only if that entity has failed to take required organizational 




The entity fine (§§ 4 ff VbVG) is intended as a penalty. It is measured according to the 
“daily rate” system (meaning the entity's economic capacity), the maximum daily rate be-
ing 10,000 euros. The number of daily rates is to be measured by the court under consid-
eration of the severity of the offense (§ 5 VbVG). Since the law prescribes a maximum of 
180 daily rates, the pecuniary fine can be no more than 1.8 million euros. Under certain 
conditions, some or all of the pecuniary fine pronounced is subject to conditional leniency 
(§§ 6f VbVG). 
 
C. Alternative Forms of Action (“diversionelle Erledigung”) 
 
Not least due to considerations of procedural economy, § 19 VbVG provides for the pos-
sibility of (intervening) alternative forms of action (“diversionelle Erledigung”) for of-
fenses punishable by prison terms of five years or less. “Alternative” primarily means a 
“diversion” from the normal response to criminal conduct, a diversion that considerably 
shortens the respective proceedings. Settling corporate criminal proceedings by way of 
such a diversion requires that the facts of the case be sufficiently clear. The facts of the 
case are deemed “sufficiently clear” if a high probability of conviction6 exists. Moreover, 
such a diversion is permitted in corporate criminal proceedings only if the proceedings 
cannot be terminated without consequences and a procedure in accordance with § 18 
VbVG (the public attorney's discretion to prosecute7) is out of the question. Additional 
mandatory conditions are the full compensation for the damage and the curing of the act's 
	
		
6  Hans Valentin Schroll & Robert Kert, in: Wiener Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, § 198 marginal no. 3 
(Helmut Fuchs & Eckart Ratz, 2016); HANNES SCHÜTZ, DIVERSIONSENTSCHEIDUNGEN IM STRAFRECHT 
55 (2003). 
7  See II. D. 
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consequences.8 The public prosecutor's office or the court must also take special and gen-
eral preventive considerations 9  into account in a procedure in accordance with § 19 
VbVG. 
 
In proceedings against entities, paying a monetary amount of fifty daily rates or less, spec-
ifying a probational period, and rendering community service are foreseen as alternative 
measures. 
 
Since the alternative form of action is voluntary, it requires the consent of the entity con-
cerned, which the entity gives by voluntarily assuming the alternative obligations de-
manded in the offer made by the public prosecutor or the court and (promptly) fulfilling 
those obligations. Successful alternative forms of action therefore require that a consensus 
be reached between the entity and the public prosecutor or the court, and effectively end 
the proceedings. 
 
D. The District Attorney's Discretion to Prosecute (“Verfolgungsermessen der 
Staatsanwaltschaft“) 
 
One of the most central provisions of the VbVG is probably the legal doctrine of the dis-
trict attorney's discretion to prosecute, which is standardized in § 18 VbVG and which 
promotes communication and consensus.10 This grants the district attorney's office a dis-
cretion that exceeds the general options for termination under the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure.11 In accordance with the wording under § 18 VbVG as a decision aris-
ing from a circumscribed power and not a discretionary decision,12 the district attorney 
may refrain or (until the evidence has been collected in the main proceedings) withdraw 
from prosecuting an entity only after (completely13) weighing a series of criteria named by 
law that make prosecution and sanctions appear unnecessary. The individual criteria that 
must be weighed concern the minimal socially disruptive value of the offense at hand. But 
they must always be tied together with considerations of procedural economy and the 
goal of the punishment. Refraining from prosecution is always excluded, however, if 
	
		
8  Marianne Hilf & Fritz Zeder, in: Wiener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 19 VbVG marginal no. 5 (Frank 
Höpfel & Eckart Ratz, 2nd ed., 2010). 
9  EINHARD STEININGER; VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZ ch. 7 marginal no. 9 (2nd ed., 2018). 
10  Heidelinde Luef-Kölbl, Rolle und Problematik „konsensualer“ Verfahrenserledigungen in einem Strafprozess 
gegen Verbände, in: Unternehmensstrafrecht 369 (Marianne Lehmkuhl & Wolfgang Wohlers, 2020); Jakob 
Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich – ein 
Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq. marginal no. 2.142 (Robert Kert & 
Georg Kodek, 2016). 
11  Insofar ascribed FRITZ ZEDER, VBVG 90 (2006) „experimental character“ for individual criminal proceedings 
to this article. 
12  Marianne Hilf, Verfolgungsermessen und Diversion im Verbandsstrafverfahren, in: Strafprozessrecht im Wan-
del: Festschrift für Roland Miklau zum 65. Geburtstag 201 (Reinhard Moos et al eds., 2006). 
13  A sequence or weighting of the individual criteria concerning their significance is not provided for by statute. 
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there are general or special preventive reasons for prosecuting the entity, or if such prose-
cution appears called for in light of a special public interest (§ 18(2) VbVG). Since the 
scope of application of the discretion to prosecute is not subject to any reduction, the 
district attorney may in principle refrain from prosecuting any category of offense if the 
conditions for doing so are met. Admittedly: the criterion of offense severity will set a 
limit in this case.14 
 
Therefore, the option of refraining from prosecuting an entity in accordance with 
§ 18 VbVG primarily serves to relieve the district attorney, the criminal police, and (sub-
sequently) the courts, but especially to protect the economic existence of companies as 
well.15 
III. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VbVG 
 
It must be stated in advance that the number of procedural settlements under the VbVG 
is (still) extremely low when measured against the total number of general procedural set-
tlements by the prosecuting authorities in Austria.16 This is not least attributable to the 
hesitant practice of the police regarding criminal charges. 17 However, a continual increase 
in VbVG proceedings can be recorded in recent years. For example, in 2012 there were 
only 93 final (substantive) decisions on the merits ("meritorische Entscheidungen")18, but 
in 2018 there were already 288.19 And we can probably assume this upward trend will con-
tinue during the next few years. 
 
A study20 on the VbVG’s frequency of application during 2006 to 2011, which was per-
formed five years after the VbVG took effect, essentially showed that corporate criminal 
	
		
14  Similarly Robert Kert, Das Verfolgungsermessen im Verbandsstrafrecht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- 
UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT 70, 71 (2017). 
15  Cf. Marianne Hilf & Fritz Zeder, in: Wiener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 18 VbVG marginal no. 1 
(Frank Höpfel & Eckart Ratz, 2nd ed., 2010); Robert Kert, Das Verfolgungsermessen im Verbandsstrafrecht, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT 70 (2017). 
16  Bettina Knötzl, Von gefährlichen Geschenken & bestechenden Erkenntnissen zu Compliance, FACHZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT („ECOLEX“) 554 (2012) believes Austria in a „sleeping beauty slumber“ 
in terms of control corruption. 
17  Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTS-
BLATT 415, 418 (2013). 
18  Without adding substantive decisions such as abruption, separation or other conclusions. 
19  Federal Ministry of Justice, security report 2018, p. 32, justiz.gv (Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.jus-
tiz.gv.at/home/justiz/daten-und-fakten/berichte/sicherheitsber-
ichte~2c94848525f84a630132fdbd2cc85c91.de.html. 
20  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE (2001), irks, 
https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf, (Apr.2, 2020). 
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proceedings were terminated without consequences with above-average frequency21 (as-
suming that they occurred in accordance with § 18 VbVG22) and that the ratio of court 
acquittal was significantly higher than those of other criminal proceedings. The study also 
showed that district attorneys did not terminate the proceedings as an alternative action 
(Diversion) as often as they terminated general proceedings in the same manner.23 This 
hesitant practice of application in the study is justified, among other reasons, by the fact 
that criminal prosecution authorities still lacked practical experiences and routines in deal-
ing with the VbVG.24 But the low frequency of application can also be attributed to res-
ervations felt by the members of the judiciary toward corporate liability.25 
 
The fact that nothing in these findings appears to have changed considerably in subse-
quent years is proven by observing the procedural settlements for VbVG proceedings 
from 2012 to 2018 as well:26 Of the (substantive)27 decisions on the merits ("meritorische 
Entscheidungen"), in the seven-year average around 80% ended through termination by 
the prosecuting authorities without consequences.28 An alternative action was used in 
around 2% of the cases. The prosecuting authorities pressed charges in around 17% of 
cases. 
 
In comparison: In general, the rate of termination by the district attorney in Austria in a 
multi-year average is around 60%, and around 16% of cases end through an alternative 
action by the district attorney. Around 24% of cases on average are settled by pressing 
	
		
21  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 74 et seq. (2001), 
irks (Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
22  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 3 (2001), irks 
(Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
23  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 3 et seq. (2001), 
irks (Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
24  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 4 (2001), irks 
(Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
25  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 112 et seq. (2001), 
irks (Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
26  The following numbers are based on the statistical numbers of Federal Ministry of Justice, security report 2018, 
32 justiz.gv (Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.justiz.gv.at/home/justiz/daten-und-fakten/berichte/sicherheitsber-
ichte~2c94848525f84a630132fdbd2cc85c91.de.html, on own calculations and may vary in total from 100 % due 
to roundings.  
27  Therefore, this is without taking the non-substantive decisions into account, which accounted for 21 % of the 
cases in this period under observation. 
28  Whereas the proceeding against accused natural persons, at the same time as the entities, were terminated in 
only about 64 % of the cases, cf. Richard Soyer & Stefan Schumann, Die „Frankfurter Thesen“ zum Unterneh-
mensstrafecht unter Einbeziehung der Erfahrungen in Österreich, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND 
STEUERSTRAFRECHT („WISTRA“) 321, 324 (2018). 
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charges.29 This shows that the trend of the first five years has continued, and that termi-
nation rates in proceedings against entities are above average, probably owing mostly to 
the district attorney’s far-reaching discretion to prosecute under § 18 VbVG.30 However, 
the displacement effect caused by the alternative form of action through the discretion to 
prosecute can also be recognized.31 This is worrying primarily regarding the principle of 
searching for substantive truth, since sufficient clarity of the facts of the case is demanded 
when alternative forms of action are taken, but this condition is lacking for proceedings 
in accordance with § 18 VbVG. 
 
Furthermore, during proceedings against entities, the procedure of the courts clearly de-
viates from the general picture. Although the average long-term acquittal rate from the 
courts lies around 15%32, main proceedings against entities end with an acquittal in around 
36% of cases on average (2012–2018). The rate of conviction generally lies at over 50% on 
average33, but only 35% on average for corporate criminal proceedings during a seven-year 
period. With alternative forms of action, on the other hand, around 16% of corporate 
criminal proceedings are ended by the courts like the general proceedings. These findings 
also support the proposition outlined above: that alternative forms of action are displaced 
through the district attorney's discretion to prosecute. 
 
In the result, it can be stated that the district attorney’s discretion to prosecute takes on a 
disproportionately high role during criminal proceedings against entities.34 One possible 
reason for this, among others, is the continuing skepticism that judicial bodies harbor 
against corporate criminal liability. But the additional expense that criminal prosecution 
authorities must incur for criminal proceedings against an entity, while facing inadequate 
opportunity for sanctions and a permanent scarcity of resources, also does its part to keep 
the Austrian Act on Corporate Criminal Liability from being applied more than hesi-




29  Federal Ministry of Justice, security report 2018, justiz.gv (Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.justiz.gv.at/home/jus-
tiz/daten-und-fakten/berichte/sicherheitsberichte~2c94848525f84a630132fdbd2cc85c91.de.html. 
30  Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTS-
BLATT 415, 417 (2013). 
31  This was already feared in the development of the statute: cf. FRITZ ZEDER, VBVG 91 (2006). 
32  Last for 2018: 17 % (source: ministry of the interior, security report 2018, 21, bmi.gv,, (Apr. 02, 2020), 
https://www.bmi.gv.at/508/files/SIB_2018/4_SIB_2018_BMVRDJ_web.pdf. 
33  Last for 2018: 56,7 % (source: ministry of the interior, security report 2018, 21, bmi.gv,, (Apr. 02, 2020), 
https://www.bmi.gv.at/508/files/SIB_2018/4_SIB_2018_BMVRDJ_web.pdf. 
34  Similarly Lyane Sautner, Grundlagen und Herausforderungen der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit juristi-
scher Personen in Österreich, ÖSTERREICHISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG (ÖJZ) 551 (2012). 
35  Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTS-
BLATT 415, 418 (2013). 
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IV. PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY VERSUS OPPORTUNITY 
 
According to the view expressed in the legal materials on the Austrian Act on Corporate 
Criminal Liability, the district attorney’s discretion to prosecute is indeed a “regulation of 
opportunity,”36 but one which does not oppose the principle of legality which applies in 
the VbVG.37 On the other hand, the literature repeatedly expresses the view that the dis-
trict attorney’s discretion to prosecute under § 18 VbVG is not a regulation of appropri-
ateness, but should be deemed only an additional, legally determined alternative action 
that the district attorney may take38 or a (mere) restriction of the principle of legality .39 
 
However, the district attorney's discretion to prosecute does not appear unproblematic. 
The frequency of application of § 18 VbVG raises the question of whether the State’s right 
to inflict punishment can still be asserted in corporate proceedings, thereby constituting 
effective combat against criminality in associations and companies. Since the termination 
of proceedings under § 18 VbVG is not subject to the courts’ control, the district attorney's 
procedure is mostly nontransparent. At the same time, the frequency of application un-
derscores the dominant role the district attorney plays in criminal proceedings against en-
tities, since the district attorney alone may decide whether or not to avail itself of its dis-
cretion to prosecute. Admittedly, it may not decide arbitrarily, but is bound by a discre-
tion that arises from circumscribed powers by means of the prescribed criteria. However, 
this does not entitle the prosecuted entity to any subjective right to termination under 
§ 18 VbVG.40 And not least, such terminations carried out by the district attorney must 
also satisfy the determinants of the principle of equality, under which any unequal treat-
ment of accused parties must be strictly justified in fact.41 Therefore, improper termina-




36  Similarly Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, AN-
WALTSBLATT 415, 416 (2013); Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen 
und Verbänden in Österreich – ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq. 
marginal no. 2.133 (Robert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016). 
37  ErläutRV 994 BlgNR 22. GP 34; also Richard Soyer & Stefan Schumann, Die „Frankfurter Thesen“ zum Un-
ternehmensstrafecht unter Einbeziehung der Erfahrungen in Österreich, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- 
UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT („WISTRA“) 321, 324 (2018) talk about an expediency article. 
38  Marianne Hilf & Fritz Zeder, in: Wiener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 18 VbVG marginal no. 4 (Frank 
Höpfel & Eckart Ratz, 2nd ed., 2010); Robert Kert, Umfang und Grenzen des Opportunitätsprinzips im Ver-
bandsstrafrecht, in: Finanzstrafrecht 2016 197 et seq. (Roman Leitner & Rainer Brandl, 2017); EINHARD 
STEININGER; VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZ ch. 9 marginal no. 9 et seq. (2nd ed., 2018); Ein-
hard Steininger, Die Neuorientierung des strafprozessualen Legalitätsprinzips, JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER (JBl) 
289, 298 (1986). 
39  Richard Soyer, Gerechtigkeit – Absprachen – Korruption, JOURNAL FÜR STRAFRECHT (JSt) 37, 42 (2013). 
40  Bettina Knötzl, Von gefährlichen Geschenken & bestechenden Erkenntnissen zu Compliance, FACHZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT („ECOLEX“) 554 (2012) demands a subjective right to termination of the 
proceeding for the entity. 
41  Einhard Steininger, Die Neuorientierung des strafprozessualen Legalitätsprinzips, JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER (JBl) 
289, 298 (1986). 
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V. COOPERATION AS A PREREQUISITE FOR PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH §§ 18 AND 19 VbVG 
 
Since a termination of proceedings in accordance with § 18 or 19 VbVG usually comes into 
question only if the entity exhibits positive conduct after the offense (by paying dam-
ages42, helping to clear up the case through internal investigations43, or subsequently in-
troducing compliance programs44, for example), it is recognizable that those termination 
options are closely interwoven with the entity’s willingness to cooperate.45 Moreover, 
companies are often willing to cooperate, since they have an economic interest in avoiding 
investigative procedures and a guilty verdict in accordance with the VbVG, and especially 
in being associated with as little negative publicity as possible.46 The VbVG’s general pre-
ventive effect is not least attributable to a company’s fear of negative media reports re-
garding corporate criminal proceedings conducted against that company.47  However, 
practice shows that companies do not usually fear being fined as an entity.48 With a max-
imum limit of 1.8 million euros, such fines aren't a great deterrent to companies. The first 
time an entity is convicted, courts usually pronounce only 20% to 30% of the penalty 
	
		
42  Cf. Heidelinde Luef-Kölbl, Rolle und Problematik „konsensualer“ Verfahrenserledigungen in einem Strafpro-
zess gegen Verbände, in: Unternehmensstrafrecht 397 (Marianne Lehmkuhl & Wolfgang Wohlers, 2020). 
43  On the topic and difficulty of internal investigations in more detail among others Norbert Wess & Markus 
Machan, Zum Anwaltsprivileg im Rahmen von unternehmensinternen Ermittlungen, in: Jahrbuch Wirt-
schaftsstrafrecht und Organverantwortlichkeit 2017 58 (Peter Lewisch, 2017); Lukas Staffler, Internal Investi-
gations und nemo tenetur, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT (ZWF) 174 (2018); 
Patrick Madl, Unternehmensinterne Untersuchungen im Wirtschaftsstrafverfahren, in: Das große Handbuch 
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 815 et seq. (Robert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016); Norbert Wess, Unternehmensinterne 
Ermittlungen – Erfahrungen und Problemstellungen in Österreich, ANWALTSBLATT (AnwBl) 223 (2013). 
44  Cf. „Compliance“ as a group of themes in general among others Richard Soyer & Sergio Pollak, Compliance: 
Mehr als ein Mode(Zauber-)Wort, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 1013 et seq. (Robert Kert & 
Georg Kodek, 2016). 
45  Cf. in more detail Heidelinde Luef-Kölbl, Rolle und Problematik „konsensualer“ Verfahrenserledigungen in 
einem Strafprozess gegen Verbände, in: Unternehmensstrafrecht 371 et seq. (Marianne Lehmkuhl & Wolfgang 
Wohlers, 2020). 
46  Michael Rohregger & Norbert Wess, Verbandsverantwortlichkeitsgesetz, in: Praktikerkommentar Wirtschafts-
strafrecht § 1 VbVG marginal no. 7 (Mathias Preuschl & Norbert Wess 2018). 
47  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 124 (2001), irks 
(Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
48  Norbert Wess et al, (Neben-)Folgen einer Verurteilung nach dem VbVG, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- 
UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT (ZWF) 54, 55 (2017); Norbert Wess & Markus Machan, Zum Anwaltsprivileg im 
Rahmen von unternehmensinternen Ermittlungen, in: Jahrbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht und Organverantwort-
lichkeit 2017 58 (Peter Lewisch, 2017); Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept 
und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTSBLATT 415, 417 (2013). 
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range.49 Far more threatening for companies are the incidental legal consequences50 that 
judicial sentencing might bring, such as being sued for damages under civil law or banned 
from participating in public tenders51. Moreover, the loss of reputation tied to a convic-
tion52 can impair future transactions and the trust of customers or suppliers.53 Therefore, 
defence lawyers also use cooperative behaviour54 as a strategic means for convincing the 
criminal prosecution authorities that the conditions for terminating proceedings in ac-
cordance with §§ 18 or 19 VbVG have been met. However, the companies’ interest in self-
preservation55 may not blind us to the fact that there is a fine line between willingness to 




The introduction of the Austrian Act on Corporate Criminal Liability was seen as a par-
adigm shift within Austrian criminal law.57 That estimation applies not least to the broad-
ness of the district attorney’s discretion to prosecute, which far exceeds the termination 
options under the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and is based on the preventive 
orientation of the VbVG.58 Together with the option of termination through an alterna-
	
		
49  Norbert Wess & Markus Machan, Zum Anwaltsprivileg im Rahmen von unternehmensinternen Ermittlungen, 
in: Jahrbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht und Organverantwortlichkeit 2017 58 (Peter Lewisch, 2017). 
50  Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich 
– ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq., marginal no. 2.118, 2.193, (Ro-
bert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016). 
51  Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich 
– ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq., marginal no. 2.116 (Robert Kert 
& Georg Kodek, 2016). 
52  Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich 
– ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq., marginal no. 2.118, 2.144 (Ro-
bert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016). 
53  Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTS-
BLATT 415, 418 (2013); Lukas Staffler, Internal Investigations und nemo tenetur, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRT-
SCHAFTS- UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT (ZWF) 174 (2018). 
54  Cf. Alexia Stuefer, Strategien der Verteidigung in Wirtschaftsstrafsachen, in: Das große Handbuch Wirt-
schaftsstrafrecht 895 et seq., marginal no. 24.32 (Robert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016). 
55  Amr Sarhan, Wie viel Kooperation zwischen Unternehmen und der Strafjustiz bei der Aufklärung verbands-
interner Kriminalität verträgt der Strafprozess?, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAF-
RECHT (WISTRA) 336, 337 (2017). 
56  Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich 
– ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq. marginal no. 2.144 (Robert Kert 
& Georg Kodek, 2016) believes to see "the picture of the hold-up carrot“ in § 18 VbVG. 
57  FRITZ ZEDER, VBVG 3 (2006). 
58  ErlRV 994 BlgNR 22. GP 34. 
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tive form of action, this strongly encourages a company to cooperate if investigative pro-
ceedings are initiated against an entity in accordance with the VbVG.59 From the stand-
point of the entity concerned, consensual settlement of the criminal proceedings gives 
them an opportunity to avoid a conviction (and the associated risk of farther-reaching 
financial loss) and to minimize damage. Cooperative conduct pays off for the entity, since 
all the incentives standardized under the law can allow them to expect either more lenient 
treatment when their fine is assessed or even the termination of the proceedings without 
consequences. It also allows the criminal prosecution authorities to end the criminal pro-
ceedings efficiently while preserving resources. And not least, the focus on cooperation 
and communication corresponds to the VbVG’s preventive orientation, and future-fo-
cused preventive mechanisms can in many cases make a greater contribution to rehabili-
tating the entity than can repressive reactions to criminal conduct.60 
 
The clear dominance of the terminations without consequences under § 18 VbVG in pro-
ceedings during corporate criminal offenses is surprising, however, since, although this 
regulation serves the companies’ economic existence and provides advantages in terms of 
procedural economy, it also entails risks for criminal justice — especially regarding the 




59  The Austrian Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) decided, as part of his validation if the Austrian 
Act on Corporate Criminal Liability (VbVG, VfGH 2.12.2016, G 497/2015, G 679/2015) is in conformity with 
the constitution, that the sanction system with reference to §§ 18 and 19 VbVG is appropriate and proportion-
ate. 
60  Rainer Brandl & Roman Leitner, Bestrafung von Verbänden für Finanzvergehen (Teil II), STEUER UND 
WIRTSCHAFTSKARTEI (SWK) 980, 983 et seq. (2018). 
